Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists by Woll, Cornelia
Journal of Public Policy
http://journals.cambridge.org/PUP
Additional services for Journal of Public Policy:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Leading the Dance? Power and Political
Resources of Business Lobbyists
CORNELIA WOLL
Journal of Public Policy / Volume 27 / Issue 01 / May 2007, pp 57 - 78
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X07000633, Published online: 18 January 2007
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0143814X07000633
How to cite this article:
CORNELIA WOLL (2007). Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of
Business Lobbyists. Journal of Public Policy, 27, pp 57-78 doi:10.1017/
S0143814X07000633
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/PUP, IP address: 193.54.67.94 on 09 Jul 2014
Leading the Dance? Power and Political
Resources of Business Lobbyists
CORNELIA WOLL Centre d’Eu tudes et de Recherches Internationales,
Sciences Po
ABSTRACT
Studies of lobbying try to determine the influence and power of
non-governmental actors on public policy. Although influence is very
difficult to measure empirically, many continue to push for better
research design to solve the problem. Through case studies of business-
government relations in the United States and the European Union, this
article argues that the difficulties with power and influence concern not
only their operationalisation, but they also reflect conceptual confusions.
Trying to determine the ‘ winners’ and ‘ losers’ of a policy issue can be
misleading, since power also structures apparently harmonious exchange
relationships. The perceived success of business lobbying in the cases
studied depended on the governments’ receptiveness to their demands,
which in turn depended on strategic advantages they saw for themselves
in international negotiations. Even when business appears to lead the
dance, it is more promising to look at resource distribution and the
interdependence of both sides, instead of assuming the domination of
business power over policy outcomes.
Introduction
For almost a century, scholars have been interested in the political
influence of interest groups (Bentley ; Odegard ; Schattschnei-
der ). The power of private actors and the balance between
individual interests and the public good is a central question of
democratic theory. Business actors, above all, often seem to win this
balancing act in their favour, so that activists and researchers push for
a better understanding of interests groups’ power (Balanya` et al. ;
Du¨r ; Greenwood and Jacek ; Hertz ; Wallach and Sforza
).
The return to the question of power in this special issue springs from
a frustration with the recent lobbying literature, which seemingly
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produces case study after case study without indicating anything more
systematic about the real impact of groups on public policy (cf. Andersen
and Eliassen ). Indeed, many researchers say quite explicitly that
they avoid talking about power or influence, because it is so difficult to
measure (e.g. Bouwen : ). A response should therefore be to
develop better or more ambitious research designs that allow measuring
the impact of lobbying on policy outcomes and thus specify the power of
groups.
Although power needs to be at the heart of research on lobbying and
corporate political activities, this article cautions against simplistic
understandings of business-government relationships and hasty conclu-
sions about power and influence. On a theoretical level, the problem with
power and influence is not just its operationalisation, but even more, its
conceptualization. Scholars who push for a study of interest group power
base their ambitions on a behaviourist conception where power is
expressed in action and conflict. Joining the more recent literature on
power, I argue that power is a relational concept that is more subtle and
diffuse. It is misleading to conceive of politics as a game, where clear
winners and losers could be identified (Salisbury ), if we only had the
necessary information about their preferences.
I illustrate these contentions with three case studies of business lobbying
in the United States and the European Union. I examine lobbying on the
issue of international trade liberalization in financial services in the
United States, and telecommunication services and international air
transport services in the European Union. The three cases exemplify
apparently different business-government power constellations. The
lobbying of American financial service firms for a General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) is often cited as a proof of business power, a
case where big financial companies got exactly what they wanted (Arkell
; Sell ; Wesselius ; Wesselius ). Telecommunication
liberalization, in turn, seems like a case of lobbying failure. The actual
telecommunication service providers, especially in Europe, should have
protected their home markets and must have lost against the lobbying of
user companies. Air transport, is a mixed case, where the political
initiatives came from both the European Commission and the European
airlines, which then developed a mutually beneficial working relationship.
A closer examination shows, however, that in all three cases similar
forces were at work. Even when firm preferences were effectively
reflected in the policy output, the impact of business depended on the
interest government had in letting business play its role. In the inter-
national negotiation context, governments encouraged business activities
when they saw a strategic advantage in cooperation. The apparent
lobbying success is therefore not an indication of ‘ power’, in the sense of
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victory in a business-government conflict, but of the convergence of
business and government objectives.
The analysis leads to two more general conclusions. First, business is
not all-powerful, as some observers seem to indicate, because its influence
depends on the receptiveness of the government it interacts with. Yet,
harmonious decision-making does not mean that power is not an issue.
On the contrary, a second conclusion is that power is one of the bases of
successful exchange relationships. Power is omnipresent in business-
government exchanges, but often too subtle to measure across cases.
However, we can be certain that those actors that cannot even enter into
an exchange relationship are powerless. The article therefore encourages
research on lobbying that continues to study systematically elements of
power such as resources and access, instead of trying to work on power
or influence directly.
The first section defines the notion of power and clarifies why previous
studies have found working with the concepts difficult. It then turns to the
related categories of ‘ influence’ and ‘ resources’, shows how they are
articulated, and argues that research focusing on resource distribution
allows one to go beyond a behaviourist understanding of power. A second
section presents the three case studies that illustrate business-government
relations where lobbyists are either powerful, weak or on equal footing
with government representatives. A third section discusses business-
government relations and shows the interdependencies that characterize
all of them. The conclusion summarizes lessons for future research.
Power in the study of business lobbying
As Du¨r and De Bie`vre underline in their introduction to this special issue,
studying the power of groups has a long tradition in political science
research. The community power and pluralism approaches revealed
many unresolved questions about power and influence, which eventually
led to the decline of the group approach. Yet the question goes to the
heart of democratic theory. Scholars therefore kept returning to the
search for systematic evidence of the power distribution between societal
and governmental actors. In one of the most complete reviews of the
lobbying literature, Baumgartner and Leech (: ) underline that the
study of power and influence remains a great area of confusion. After a
series of efforts in the s and s,
they eventually gave up in the wake of vituperative and inconclusive debates.
Rather than learn from this experience, after a brief lull when fewer lobbying
studies were done, scholars have returned to the same doomed research idea.
Many recent studies have been designed around the false premise that we can
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observe the actions of influence and power. There is little reason to organize a
project on the chimerical promise of measuring the unmeasurable.
What is it about power and influence that is so difficult to study?
Power
In the following discussion, I will use Weber’s ( []: ) definition
of power as ‘ the opportunity to impose one’s will in a social relationship,
even against resistance, without consideration to what this opportunity
rests on.’ Focusing on the elements of conflict and the exercise of power
has become central to later works on power and is taken up in Dahl’s
(: ) definition ‘ A has power over B to the extent that he can get
B to do something that B would not otherwise do.’ For the behaviourists
working in this tradition, studying power thus meant understanding who
prevails in conflicts related to decision-making.
This conception was subsequently critiqued from many different angles
for being incomplete. Elitists drew attention to the fact that power does
not only affect decision-making, but also the activities that precede
decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz ). To these two forms of
power exercise, Lukes () added a third one, where conflict was not
really manifest: latent conflicts of interest. However, all three conceptu-
alizations rely on the exercise of power.
A different perspective concentrates not on the exercise of power, but
on the control over resources (cf. Hart ). Whether power is observed
in open or latent conflict or in material resources, all these conceptions
use power as a causal explanation for policy outcomes.
In contrast to this material resource perspective, Walter Korpi ()
proposes a power resources approach that goes beyond power as a causal
explanation for outcomes. Instead, he assumes that actors play strategic
games and make interdependent choices based on how they perceive the
resources of their counterparts. Power resources are therefore part of an
intentional explanation of action which, in turn, helps to explain policy
outcomes; however, they do not cause a given outcome. His model
draws attention to two facts that are of interest for the study of lobbying.
First, intentional actors are likely to develop long-term strategies and
indirect strategies, designed to increase the effectiveness of their resources
(Korpi : ). Second, the interdependence of choices and the
distribution of power resources influence the extent to which rational
actors will allow conflict of interests between them to generate manifest
conflicts. For Korpi, power resources can be both positive (rewards) or
negative (pressure). Whenever possible, actors may have an interest in
using positive resources for their interactions, according to table  (Korpi
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: ). Exchange is thus not the antithesis of power (contrary to Blau
); power structures exchange as well as conflict.
To summarize, firstly, power is invisible, except if one assumes
that power equals material resources. Second, power determines the
resolution of conflicts and affects policy-making in settings that do not
develop into an open conflict. Third, power is revealed in policy
outcomes only if we can trace the conflicts of interest involved on a
particular issue. This, in turn, is extremely difficult if one accepts that
conflicts of interests can also be latent. In other words, even Weber’s
precise definition does not help us to develop an empirical research
design. One can choose to work with simplistic assumptions in the
behaviourist tradition where power is expressed in conflict or material
resource distribution. If we seek to work on all forms of power, however,
we will encounter difficulties in comparing systematically across a variety
of cases.
Inﬂuence, resources and access
Many researchers therefore choose to work on elements of power, most
notably influence and the use of resources. Of the two, influence seems
closest to power, because it refers to the activity of producing change on
a given issue (see Du¨r and De Bie`vre in this issue). Hence, it can be seen
as the equivalent to a narrow definition of power, namely one focused on
the exercise of power and its causal effect on policy outcomes.
Reducing the scope of inquiry in this way might already be helpful,
even if it is still difficult to measure the precise impact of one actor on a
political phenomenon, because one would need to know what would
have happened without the participation of that actor. Only knowing
that the policy outcome corresponded to the preferences of the actor in
question does not help, even if the actor is powerful, because influence
requires a causal link. If the American president wants it to rain the next
morning and it actually does, we have not proven that he has actually
influenced the weather. Still, scholars have advanced on developing
theoretical ‘ signalling models’ that specify under which conditions
T . Exchange and conflict in the power resource
approach
type of power resource used by B
reward pressure
type of power resource used by A reward exchange exploitation
pressure exploitation conflict
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lobbyists might be successful if they have control of certain resources (e.g.
Ainsworth ; Austen-Smith ).
Working on the resources on which power is based is more promising,
because resources are actually visible. Even though resources are not
equivalent to power, the distribution of resources, as well as the demand
for and the supply of particular resources, give important insights in the
interactions that are or are not possible between governments and
societal actors. Consider, for example, the application of Korpi’s ()
grid to the study of business-government relations in Table .
Various types of resources create specific types of interactions, which
are stable to different degrees. Furthermore, if we understand the
resources used in interactions, we can learn more about their effects and
whether other actors can employ the same resources, which reduces the
dependence of the government on one particular actor and therefore the
power of that actor over the government (see Emerson ).
Such studies of exchange relations and positive resources have been
popular in recent EU lobbying studies. Broscheid and Coen () have
examined the incentives governments use to control information supplied
by lobbyists and Bouwen (, a, b) has surveyed what types of
resources can be employed by business actors in order to obtain ‘ access’
supplied by the government. This research direction has proven quite
successful in revealing certain biases of the EU’s institutional arrange-
ment and further studies have examined the choice of resources available
to lobbyists and the relations that can develop as a consequence (Beyers
, ; Bouwen and McCown forthcoming; Mahoney ). More-
over, the study of access as a particular type of government reward has
helped the lobbying literature to move beyond conceptualizing business-
government interactions as an exchange of votes and money for
regulation (see Posner ; see Stigler ).
Studying power in business-government relations
The behaviourist approach to power and the power resource approach
focused on intentional action provide very different frameworks for
T . The power resource approach applied to business–
government relations
business actors
reward pressure
government reward exchange pressure lobying
pressure instrumentalisation conflict
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empirical research on business-government relations. According to the
behaviourist approach, we would need to find out the preferences of all
actors involved, study the conflict over decision-making and then
determine the winners and losers of the policy-decision. According to the
power resource approach, we should study the relevant resources
available to the actors involved and understand their strategic interaction
based on the perception and anticipation of these resources.
Studying preferences of firms on trade policy has a long tradition in
international political economy (Frieden ); however, very few studies
have actually surveyed preferences empirically (but see Bauer, Pool and
Dexter  ()). Since researchers generally have the ambition to
determine the firms’ ‘ real’ interest, they prefer looking at material con-
ditions and calculate the costs and benefits of a trade decision on the
individual business actors. A series of sophisticated models have been
developed to specify when business will support or not support trade
liberalization (Alt et al. ; Milner and Yoffie ; Rogowski ). For
American and European firms, the most relevant hypothesis suggests that
import-competing firms will lobby for protectionism, while exporters
support trade liberalization in order to gain access to foreign markets (see
Alt and Alesina ; see Alt and Gilligan ). If we can find cases where
business representatives lobbied actively into either one direction and if we
can establish a causal link between their lobbying and the policy outcome,
we can therefore conclude that firms were powerful policy actors.
Alternatively, studying resources and interdependent strategies
requires understanding the goods that business and government supply
or demand and the instruments with which they exert pressure.
Resources that are typically used by lobbyists include financial resources,
social capital, legal or technical expertise or other information that might
be useful to policy-makers as well as media campaigns focused on public
opinion. Governments, in turn, have control over legislation. They can
offer access or ignore lobbyists in the consultation process and ultimately
create legislation that benefits firms or inflicts costs on them.
It is furthermore important to consider indirect strategies that aim at
prudent management of power resources. In particular, we should expect
actors to avoid conflict and to accept present sacrifices in ways that can
increase future benefits. In research on business lobbying such decisions –
which seemingly defy short term profit-seeking behaviour – have been
labelled ‘ investment in political capital’ (e.g. Yoffie and Bergenstein
). We should expect business actors with power resources to enter
into interactions with governments and to try and maintain good
relations over time. By contrast, actors with few resources are less sure to
reap benefits from long-term interactions and should tend to withdraw
from interactions when there is no immediate issue at stake.
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Three cases of business-government relations: power, cooperation and weakness?
The two frameworks help to analyze who leads the dance in business
government relations. In the following, the article compares three cases:
lobbying of American financial service firms, European airlines and
European telecommunication providers on the issue of international
liberalization of their sectors. A third section then turns to the elements
highlighted above and analyzes the contributions of the two perspectives.
Since I am concentrating on business-government relationships, I focus
on the dominant business community that decided to lobby on behalf
of its sector and on its most influential activities. Internal conflicts
within each community did happen, but did not result in explicit
counter-lobbying, so I only indicate them in passing.
US ﬁnancial service ﬁrms and the GATS
Financial service firms in the US played a decisive role in bringing about
a strong US proposal for a General Agreement on the Trade of Services
(GATS) (Arkell ; Hoekman and Kostecki : ; Sell ). For
large US financial companies, trade in services became an issue in the
late s, when they realized that they had difficulties in establishing
international banking networks. American International Group (AIG),
American Express and Citibank eventually started working together and
got in touch with the US government to discuss the issue (Freeman ).
In the preparation of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the US
government and USTR in particular were enthusiastic about the idea of
broadening the GATT framework and started working towards a US
position on trade in services. (Drake and Nicolaı¨dis ; Feketekuty
). For their part, AIG, American Express and CitiCorp founded the
Coalition of Service Industries in  to continue lobbying on the issue.
The coalition of multinational companies and US government officials
benefited from early discussion in the OECD and among economists and
contributed to redefining the stakes in terms of trade, which helped to
make the demands more pressing both internally and externally (Drake
and Nicolaı¨dis : ). Even though the coalition of US firms was
originally only from the financial sector and parts of the professional
services sector, their ambition was from very early on to achieve a more
global agreement on services. Financial services, consulting, advertising,
data processing, telecommunications and transport were all relevant
services to their international operations, so they lobbied both for the
benefits of their own service expansion and as user companies of other
services. In a variety of multinational business associations, American
firms urged their foreign counterparts to take up the cause.
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The lobbying contributed to the diffusion of ideas on service exchanges
and helped to unify the position of American business on the issue
(Wesselius , ). Large companies from all sectors of the economy
started conceiving of themselves as user companies of services. Especially
in the early period, where the stakes were identified, business interests
played a decisive role. Starting in  services were taken up in the
GATT meetings as a new trade matter, and became an issue of
multilateral negotiations beginning in  with the launching of the
Uruguay Round. The GATS, one of the Marrakech agreements of the
Uruguay Round in , eventually brought service exchanges under
the same trade regime as the exchange of goods under the GATT, now
administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The GATS
agreement thus seems to be a clear example of business power over policy
outcomes.
European airlines and transatlantic liberalization
European airlines traditionally had very privileged relationships with
their national governments, but turned towards working with the
European Commission in order to achieve further liberalization of
international air transport. International aviation was traditionally regu-
lated through an extensive network of bilateral agreements. In the
mid-s, the US government set out unilaterally to achieve a certain
degree of liberalization through less restrictive bilaterals, called open-sky
agreements. Despite the benefits of the open sky agreements, the
European airlines felt that they were tailored to the advantage of US
airlines and became interested in a more comprehensive reform of global
aviation markets.
At about the same time, the EU liberalized the internal aviation
market through three packages between  and , effective in 
(Holmes and McGowan ; O’Reilly and Stone Sweet ). By April
of that year, all former monopoly or ‘ flag’ carriers had turned into
licensed community airlines that were granted right of establishment
anywhere within the European aviation area. Bilateral agreements,
however, continue to restrict traffic rights to nationals, so that they
effectively precluded a completion of the internal market, much to the
dismay of the European Commission.
When the Commission started consultations on external aviation,
European airlines saw their opportunity. After some initial discussion
within the EU, the Association of European Airlines (AEA) (, )
proposed a plan for a so-called Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
(TCAA). The European Commission enthusiastically supported the AEA
project and made it its own policy objective for international aviation
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relations. Despite the lack of formal competences on hard traffic rights,
an EU delegation nonetheless went to Washington, D.C. in December
 and proposed the TCAA to the US government and its major
airlines on behalf of the Member States. Still, the Commission had not
yet been granted negotiating rights on external negotiations. Through the
support of European airlines and a combination of legal strategies and
persuasion, the Commission eventually succeeded in obtaining a nego-
tiating mandate for a transatlantic aviation agreement on a revised
proposition (Moselle et al. ) in June . Although they complained
about not being consulted as closely as they were by their national
governments, all EU carriers saluted the project, even the smaller ones
that might be ‘ consolidated away’ in the process of liberalization. The
current EU negotiations on an open aviation area with the US were thus
born out of cooperation between the EU Commission and European
airlines.
European operators and the WTO’s basic telecommunication agreement
Few observers would have expected European telecommunication op-
erators to be as enthusiastic about multilateral liberalization as financial
service companies or European airlines. Trade liberalization in telecom-
munication services was the goal of sectoral negotiations under the
GATS, which started in May  (Cowhey and Richards ;
Petrazzini, ; Sherman ). The GATS and the desire to liberalize
telecommunication services was pushed for by user companies, such as
the International Telecommunications User Group (INTUG) or the
United States Council for International Business (USCIB), in order to
drive the costs of their international operations down (McKendrick ;
Weiss ). This directly concerned the profits of European network
operators. However, out of refusal or lack of interest, EU network
operators largely ignored WTO telecom talks in the early s. While
American firms such as AT&T or Sprint had been travelling to Geneva
regularly, the European Commission’s negotiating team found European
network operators largely unresponsive.
Internally, the WTO talks run parallel to EU efforts towards the
liberalization of national telecom markets. Proposed by the Commission
since , the EU liberalization project finally gained momentum in
 and . In , the Council adopted a green paper which
provided the basis for full liberalization of the infrastructure by January
st,  (Holmes and Young ; Sandholtz ; Schmidt ;
Thatcher ).
The initial phase of inactivity was followed by active support for
multilateral liberalization. By , EU member countries had agreed on
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a deadline for its internal liberalization process. Knowing that their home
markets would be liberalized within the EU by , several large EU
operators decided to rally behind the WTO project. Most European
operators became aware that the WTO would become crucial to telecom
affairs in Europe. The general support of liberalization then translated
into a concerted effort undertaken by the European Telecommunication
Network Operators’ association (ETNO) to advance on the issue of
multilateral liberalization.
After an extension of the original deadline of negotiation in April ,
a second and more important round of talks continued until February
. The result of these negotiations, the Basic Telecommunications
Agreement and a reference paper on regulatory provisions was finally
adopted and entered into force on February , . Despite the support
of European network operators, they did not drive the process. Many
company representatives evoke the image of a moving train that would
have advanced without them had they decided to ignore or lobby against
liberalization.
Conﬂict of interests and resource interdependencies
The three service cases illustrate very different types of business-
government relations. On financial services, the policy initiative was in
the hands of the corporate lobbyists who pushed for a project which was
eventually implemented. At first glance, one might say that business was
powerful and government was, at best, complacent. In international air
transport, the European Commission and European airlines shared the
policy initiative and developed a working relationship that clearly helped
both to advance their strategic interests. The case therefore resembles a
symbiosis of two equally powerful actors. European telecommunication
providers, appear to be particularly uninterested in the liberalization of
their sectors and engage in the policy process only after their negotiating
government, the European Commission, has already well advanced on
the issue. Are the three cases examples of business power, business-
government cooperation and government power, respectively? To
answer this question, this section re-examines the cases with the help of
the behaviourist approach focused on conflicts of interests and the power
resource approach interested in interactive strategies.
Winners and losers: tracing preferences and outcomes
Let us begin with the behaviourist approach: how do business and
government preferences compare with outcomes? In both financial
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services and air transport, policy decisions seem to correspond to firm
preferences. Large financial service companies in the US underline the
costs of doing operations abroad in the s and the benefits they hoped
to gain from a trade agreement that granted them foreign market access.
It is also true that AIG, American Express and CitiCorp were very
engaged in international operations, which should lead us to expect that
they support trade liberalization (Milner ). Given the impressive
lobbying effort of about  firm representatives at the close of the
Uruguay Round (Wesselius : ) and the correspondence of policy
outcome and lobbying demands, we can thus suspect that financial
service firms have had a significant influence on the outcome of
negotiations. Moreover, even insiders venture to imagine the counter-
factual case and suggest that business lobbying had a causal effect.
According to David Hartridge (Wesselius : ), former director of
the WTO Service Division, ‘ without the enormous pressure generated by
the American financial services sector, particularly companies like
American Express and CitiCorp, there would have been no service
agreement.’
Similarly, European airlines had a clear preference for further liber-
alization. Under the status quo, they felt disadvantaged compared to
their US competitors. All members of the association AEA were flag
carriers with often considerable international operations, so it is no
surprise that they were supportive of a more advantageous international
architecture. Since the Commission had a strategic interest in expanding
its external competences, it immediately integrated AEA’s written policy
statements into its portfolio. In the two cases, we can therefore acknowl-
edge the influence of business actors on government policy or decisions.
The role of European telecommunication operators is more difficult to
analyze. European network operators all maintained assets that are not
mobile – the local networks – which meant that their profits on local
networks would decrease once their monopoly status was lost. Indeed, a
closer examination shows that their support for multilateral liberalization
resulted from their experiences with domestic deregulation. Operators of
countries that had deregulated their domestic network early on, like the
UK or Sweden were enthusiastic about liberalization, while Southern
countries tended to be more hesitant. European network operators were
not necessarily international players. However, since European liberaliz-
ation opened up local markets anyway, firms started to reconsider their
interest. Several of the big European operators had started investing
abroad in the s and the enthusiasm of the internet bubble years
seemingly launched a competition for world market shares. Assuring
market access through a multilateral agreement therefore corresponded
to the expansive business strategy of these large operators, even though
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the tight connection between the more reserved governments and the
business oriented executive boards sometimes made the company stances
more ambiguous. By considering merely the economic context, it is
difficult to determine where the ‘ real’ interests of European operators lay.
Certainly, they did not want to lose their local dominance, but it is
plausible that some also became interested in opportunities abroad. In
either case, it is problematic to argue that they were influential, even if
most companies proclaim having been in support of liberalization.
But what kind of power can we ascribe to them? If one was trying to
detect a latent conflict of interests, it seems that they did lose out to
user lobbies pressing for liberalization. Or should we rely on their
proclaimed turn towards liberalization and assume that they were
winners after all?
Interactive strategies and resources
If we consider power distribution according to the intentional approach
to power resource management, we obtain a slightly different under-
standing of the three cases. In all three cases, we can observe power
resources being activated on both sides, even though the nature of the
business-government interactions in financial services and air transport is
different from the interaction in telecommunications.
Financial services
The resources financial service firms employed in order to lobby for a
service trade agreement consisted of considerable financial investment
and legal and technical expertise. Private companies were able to employ
a large number of experts and consultants that supplemented the work of
government representatives. The companies most involved in the nego-
tiations even met with representatives of foreign governments, making
service trade one of the rare issues of triangular diplomacy (Stopford and
Strange ). In a classic economic model of interest groups, such effort
and expenses should be expected if they enable the company to increase
its profits accordingly. However, several authors have noted that the
concrete effects of such an agreement on the day-to-day operations of the
firms were rather difficult to evaluate. Yoffie and Bergenstein ()
suggest that American Express built political capital by ‘ developing an
issue which had broad political appeal and fit into the agendas of key
politicians’ even though the significance of the issue for American
Express’ business operations was not certain. The period between the
moment these companies decided to lobby on the issue and the moment
the service agreement was finally signed spanned almost  years – an
eternity in business affairs. Short-term profit seeking cannot help us to
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explain the companies’ strategies. Instead, they are based on speculations
about long-term benefits.
The cooperation between USTR and US financial companies could be
maintained because the two parties’ interests corresponded: the US
wanted to draw up a strong proposal to negotiate multilaterally and US
financial companies wanted to have a say on the future of service
exchanges. The fact that this cooperation was maintained for such a long
time in the  and the early s, however, was due to the fact that
business constantly activated resources that were valuable to the govern-
ment. In addition to financial, legal and technical expertise, the support
of service firms also gave USTR the legitimacy to push for a new service
agreement in exchange for concessions on agriculture. The US govern-
ment, in turn, offered the companies access. This form of exchange based
on mutual benefits evolved harmoniously. Conflict could be avoided,
which highlights that both business and government had important
power resources at their disposal.
Air transport
Business-government relations on international air transport in the EU
were equally marked by the mutually beneficial exchange of rewards.
European flag carriers already maintained privileged relationships with
their national governments but decided to turn to the European
Commission to advance on an ambitious proposal. The Commission, in
turn, was highly interested in working with the airlines, because their
project allowed the Commission to increase its own competences on
aviation (Woll ). In other words, the airlines brought legitimacy to
the EU aviation proposal and offered valuable political capital, because
they were able to persuade their national governments to consider the
Commission proposal.
Still, the exchange relationship between the airlines and the Commis-
sion risked several times to turn into manifest conflict, which illustrates
that the power resources activated were less reliable than in the case of
business-government relations on financial services. The Commission, in
particular, tried to pressure the Member States into granting it an
external negotiation mandate through the means of legal strategies.
Following the ruling of the European Court of Justice on  November
, the Commission called upon the Member States to stop flight
operations under the open sky agreements. This would have incurred
immense costs on the airlines, which were outraged by the Commission’s
way of proceeding. The EU Transport Commissioner Loyola di Palacio
therefore met privately with the European airlines to assure them that
this statement was just a matter of political rhetoric directed at the
Member States and not at the airlines’ operations.
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The shift to open conflict, albeit minimal, shows that the cooperation
between the Commission and the airlines rested on power resources that
were less reliable than in the financial service case. Especially the
Commission was lacking resources in the beginning, because Member
States had the final say over EU legislation. For European airlines,
government partners are to a certain degree exchangeable; they depend
less on the Commission than American firms depend on the US
government. As a consequence, relations were less stable between the
Commission and the European carriers than in the previous case.
Telecommunication services
Business-government relations in the EU on multilateral telecommuni-
cation liberalization also indicate that both sides had power resources at
their disposal. Still, the interaction was slightly less balanced. In the
course of internal liberalization, the Commission had sought out the
direct advice and support of the operators and associated them through
a high level expert committee around Telecom Commissioner Martin
Bangemann (European Commission : ). In the course of this
cooperation, many network operators embraced the idea of liberaliz-
ation, to a point where they even met with their national governments to
defend the idea. France Te´le´com, for example, initially reserved about
EU liberalization, eventually embraced it and was later even more
supportive than parts of the French government (Fairbrass ).
This kind of support was valuable for EU liberalization, but the
Commission needed it somewhat less during WTO negotiations, because
the principle of liberalization had already been agreed upon. The
Commission still sought to negotiate with the backing of the European
operators and tried to involve them in the decision-making, but overall,
the contact between European companies and the EU delegation seems
to have been less intense than the cooperation between US companies
and the USTR.
However, in the second round of the negotiation, business and
government representatives from both sides judged their working rela-
tionship as successful. Nonetheless, the interest and lobbying of EU
operators did not go beyond a general support for liberalization. For
many smaller operators, the only lobbying activity, if there was any, was
their participation in the WTO working group of their European
association ETNO. However, the working relationship between ETNO
and the European Commission allowed the latter to claim that it was
negotiating in the interest of European operators. Inversely, even
operators that were against the project of liberalization could hope to
participate on some of the details by maintaining relations with the
European Commission.
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Overall, the Commission was in the drivers’ seat. Telecommunication
operators were sufficiently powerful to maintain relations with the
Commission, but in the process of negotiations they were pressured to
adapt crucial aspects of their operations.
Lessons from each approach
The behaviourist approach draws our attention to preferences and
outcomes and helps us to analyze the influence that business representa-
tives had in the financial services and air transport cases. However, the
approach is less useful when the actors’ interests cannot be determined
precisely. In telecommunications, the evolution of business preferences
over the course of EU liberalization make it hard to understand what
exactly happened during the WTO negotiations. Were European opera-
tors indeed overpowered by user group lobbying? Did they only proclaim
supporting liberalization in order not to lose face? Or did they truly
support liberalization and should be counted as the winners of this policy
issue? These questions illustrate that the behaviourist approach works
best when we have clearly defined preferences and when we can connect
the actor’s individual preferences with outcomes. Such clear preferences
are most evident when conflict arises and actors have to fight for their
respective advantages. In harmonious exchange relationships, however,
we can only deduce preferences from theory or trace them qualitatively
(Frieden ). As the telecommunications case proves, this can some-
times be of limited use. More generally speaking, the behaviourist
approach tends to turn a blind eye to power struggles that are not
manifest conflicts and sometimes requires heroic assumptions about
individual preferences in cases where relations are harmonious.
The resource approach highlights that in all three business-
government relationships actors had power resources at their disposal. A
first conclusion is therefore that all business actors and governments
studied were powerful because they were able to maintain relations over
a long period. However, business-government relations in the US on
financial service liberalization were the most stable and least marked by
open conflict. Especially the US government’s power resources were
more effective than the European Commission’s resources in the second
case. Despite the successful working relationship between the Commis-
sion and the European airlines, the exchange sometimes risked develop-
ing into conflict. Since we know that actors try to avoid open conflict
(Korpi : –), this swaying is an indication of the fragility of actors’
power resources. In telecommunications, finally, the Commission is in a
more dominant position than the European operators and even exerts
pressure on them.
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In a second conclusion, we can therefore return to Table  to classify
the three types of relations. US financial services are a clear case of
exchange: financial service firms offered financial, legal and tech-
nical support, which the US negotiating team much needed in order
to advance its other goals in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The
US government, in turn, worked closely with the firms and pushed
continuously for the agreement developed in cooperation with them. In
EU air transport, the exchange was similar, but airlines simultaneously
sided with national governments and the European Commission. The
legitimacy that the European Commission had to gain from working with
the carriers could thus be withdrawn at any time, which gave the airlines
a means to exert pressure. The Commission, in turn, seized the European
Court of Justice and threatened to inflict costs on European carriers.
Both players credibly threatened negative rewards, which explains why
the interaction sometimes risked developing into conflict. Finally, the
exchange relationship in EU telecommunications is also an exchange
relationship, but moves towards the lower quadrant of instrumentalis-
ation. The EU negotiating team did not need the network operators’
support as much during the WTO negotiations, because Member States
had already agreed to internal liberalization. The companies’ support
certainly increased their legitimacy as community negotiator, but the
pressure from the firms was not sufficient to affect the content of
negotiations in their favour.
The behaviourist approach draws attention to preferences and out-
comes, while the power resource approach concentrates on resources and
interactive strategies. As frameworks for empirical investigations, the two
might well be considered complementary. Studying preferences and
outcomes remains important for anyone interested in influence, even
T . Classifying the three cases
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though influence can only be established for certain through case studies.
Studying power resources, in turn, permits one to study the logic of
business-government interactions and to evaluate the potential effects of
a particular resource and the stability of the relationship in question.
Conclusion
Studying power not only poses problems once one tries to measure
power, it also requires making simplistic assumption in the conceptualiz-
ation of power. Through the case studies of business lobbying in the US
and the EU, the paper has tried to show that power can be quite
ambiguous and structure apparently harmonious exchange relations as
well as open conflict.
By applying Korpi’s power resource approach to business-government
relations, the paper has tried to analyze the type of relations firms and
government representatives maintained in the three cases. As long-term
strategies, exchange and conflict are more stable than instrumentalisation
or pressure lobbying. Studying resources can therefore be helpful if one
wants to understand the evolution of business-government relations over
time.
For anybody interested in concrete influence, historical narratives and
process tracing remain the most useful techniques, even if their limited
generalisability might be frustrating. Studies on lobbying will never be
disconnected from the question of influence, but they need to be carried
out in a context-specific way in order to help our understanding about a
particular policy development. After all, we rarely try to find out who the
most influential member of a parliament might be; we are much more
interested in the influence of individual members on a particular bill. The
same holds true for interest groups. It is extremely relevant to know that
trade groups in Schattscheider’s () study dictated the wording of a
bill, but the conclusions of a case study should not be taken out of context.
Normatively speaking, even stable relationships can be considered
problematic when only privileged actors are able to enter into them. If
business actors have the necessary resources to maintain stable exchange
relationships, but consumers or other non-governmental organization do
not, we can start talking about different degrees of political power
between business actors and other societal groups. The most pressing
research questions on the power of business lobbyists relate to the effects
of institutional frameworks for the distribution of political resources.
Resource asymmetries and the uneven political participation opportuni-
ties that can result from them are at the heart of democratic theory and
should not be ignored due to methodological obstacles. Combining the
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study of preference distribution and outcomes with insights on anticipa-
tive behaviour based on resource distribution can help to overcome some
of the limitations of both approaches.
NOTES
. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the meetings of this research group in Vienna
and Budapest and at a seminar of the Pôle d’action publique at CEVIPOF, Sciences Po, Paris. I would
like to thank the organizers and the participants for their detailed feedback and helpful discussion,
in particular Richard Rose, Frank Vibert, Pierre Muller and the contributors to this special issue.
. Author’s translation of the original German ‘ Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen
Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch [my italics] gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf
diese Chance beruht.’ In the English translation, this definition has previously been shortened to
power as ‘ the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber :
; see also Korpi ).
. In some aspects, Korpi’s intentional explanation resembles Michel Foucault’s treatment, for whom
power is carried in the everyday practices of human interactions. Power is manifested as people
anticipate each other’s use of resources, in particular specialized knowledge. Arguably, however, the
interactions based on the anticipated use of resources in Foucault’s writing are even less intentional
than in Korpi’s account (see Foucault ) .
. The case studies are based on  semi-directive interviews with business and government
representatives in the US and the EU. For a more detailed discussion, see Woll () .
. KLM, for example, now under the control of Air France, was one of the earliest supporters and
founding fathers of the idea for reform. TAP Portugal also explicitly promoted international
deregulation.
. With large investments in Latin America, the Spanish operator Telefo´nica, for example, supported
WTO liberalization through ETNO and at home. As part of its board of executives, the Spanish
government, however, was reserved until the end of negotiations and it is uncertain what the official
stance of the company really was (see Niemann ).
. Interview with a US business representative on  April  in Washington D.C.
. Interview with the representative of a European flag carrier, December , .
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